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Mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar emits pulses of sound from an underwater transmitter to help 
determine the size, distance, and speed of objects. The sound waves bounce off objects and reflect 
back to underwater acoustic receivers as an echo. MFA sonar has been used since World War II, 
and the Navy indicates it is the only reliable way to track submarines, especially more recently 
designed submarines that operate more quietly, making them more difficult to detect. 
Scientists have asserted that sonar may harm certain marine mammals under certain conditions, 
especially beaked whales. Depending on the exposure, they believe that sonar may damage the 
ears of the mammals, causing hemorrhaging and/or disorientation. The Navy agrees that the sonar 
may harm some marine mammals, but says it has taken protective measures so that animals are 
not harmed. 
MFA training must comply with a variety of environmental laws, unless an exemption is granted 
by the appropriate authority. Marine mammals are protected under the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act (MMPA) and some under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The training 
program must also comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and in some 
cases the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). Each of these laws provides some exemption 
for certain federal actions. The Navy has invoked all of the exemptions to continue its sonar 
training exercises. 
Litigation challenging the MFA training off the coast of Southern California ended with a 
November 2008 U.S. Supreme Court decision. The Supreme Court said that the lower court had 
improperly favored the possibility of injuring marine animals over the importance of military 
readiness. The Supreme Court’s ruling allowed the training to continue without the limitations 
imposed on it by other courts. 
 
 	




	

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA)....................................................................................... 2 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) ....................................................................................................... 3 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) ................................................................................... 4 
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) ........................................................................................ 4 
Mid-Frequency Active Sonar Litigation.......................................................................................... 5 
Legal Analysis ................................................................................................................................. 9 
 
	
Table 1. Listed Species Found Off the California Coast ............................................................... 12 
Table 2. Litigation Timeline .......................................................................................................... 13 
Table 3. Mitigation Measures ........................................................................................................ 14 
 
	
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 15 
 
 	



 



The use of sonar in Navy training exercises has been contentious. Some argue that the noise 
harms marine mammals. Others note that a well-trained military is a national priority. In the case 
of mid-frequency active sonar training exercises, the controversy was brought before the U.S. 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not consider the merits of the action—meaning it did not 
evaluate whether the Navy had met all of its environmental obligations in preparing for the 
training—but it held that the Navy could not be enjoined from training in this case based on the 
evidence of merely the possibility of harming marine life.1 This report will discuss that litigation. 
Mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar emits pulses of sound from an underwater transmitter to help 
determine the size, distance, direction, and speed of objects. The sound waves bounce off objects 
and reflect back to underwater acoustic receivers as an echo.2 MFA sonar has been used since 
World War II, and, according to the Navy, “is the only reliable way to identify, track, and target 
submarines.”3 MFA sonar has a range of up to 10 nautical miles (nm). Active sonar differs from 
passive sonar in that passive sonar only receives sound waves and does not emit them. The Navy 
indicates that passive sonar is ineffective at detecting quiet submarines, such as those that run on 
batteries. 
To prepare its fleet, the Navy conducts training exercises on a regularly scheduled rotation. This 
report considers the MFA training exercises conducted off the coast of California, which have 
been challenged on environmental grounds.4 
Scientists have suggested that MFA sonar may harm some marine mammals, especially beaked 
whales. Some opponents have noted that the sonar is emitted at 170 to 195 dB, eight to more than 
10 times louder than levels for which OSHA requires hearing protection for humans.5 However, 
noise intensities in air and water are different because of the different densities of the media and 
cannot be directly compared. Excessive noise can rupture the ears of mammals, or can disorient 
the animals so that they surface too quickly, giving them what is commonly called “the bends,” 
when nitrogen is released from solution in the blood, which can be fatal. 
The Navy agrees that the sonar could harm marine mammals under certain circumstances, but 
argues that the Navy takes additional protective measures to prevent harm. In a press release of 
December 20, 2007, the Navy indicated that it takes 29 mitigation measures to protect marine 
mammals during sonar exercises, and that no injuries have been attributed to sonar use since the 
measures were put in place in January 2007.6 
                                                                
1
 Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
2
 For more on the Navy’s sonar program, see online at http://www.navy.mil/oceans/sonar.html. 
3
 http://www.navy.mil/oceans/sonar.html. 
4
 For a broader discussion of active sonar, see CRS Report RL33133, Active Military Sonar and Marine Mammals: 
Events and References, by Eugene H. Buck and Kori Calvert. 
5
 See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(a). 
6
 Navy Invests in Protecting Marine Mammals, Navy Story Number NNS071220-22 (December 20, 2007), online at 
http://www.navy.mil/search/print.asp?story_id=34061&VIRIN=&imagetype=0&page=1.The cause of death of a 
dolphin in the area of sonar use has not been determined, although hemorrhaging in the ears and ear canals was found. 
Kenneth R. Weiss, Dolphin Dies Near Sonar Site, Los Angeles Times (February 22, 2007). 
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The Navy’s program could affect marine mammals that are protected under the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act (MMPA) and some under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The training 
program must also comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and in some 
cases, the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). Each of these laws has provisions where a 
federal action may be exempted from full compliance. The Navy has invoked exemptions under 
each of these laws to continue this program. 
This report will discuss each of these laws generally, and then review the litigation surrounding 
the Navy’s compliance with these laws in the context of mid-frequency active sonar for training 
purposes off California’s coast. 



The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) (16 U.S.C. §§ 1361 et seq.) prohibits harming 
marine mammals so that their populations would not diminish below their “optimal sustainable 
population.”7 The MMPA is intended to “protect essential habitats ... for each species of marine 
mammal from the adverse effect of man’s actions.”8 The act imposes a moratorium on the taking 
of or transporting marine mammals or products from marine mammals.9 Moratorium is defined in 
the act as “a complete cessation.”10 There are exceptions, however. Some of those exceptions 
were created by amendments in 2003 in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 to allow 
for military readiness exercises and national defense. 
Maritime military actions may be exempt from the MMPA if, after conferring with the Secretary 
of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense determines the actions are necessary for national 
defense.11 The exemption may apply for up to two years and additional exemptions are allowed. 
Congress must be given notice of the exemption. 
The MMPA has other adjustments for military actions. The MMPA has a different definition for 
harassment when conducted as part of a military readiness activity. Under the 2003 Amendments, 
the two types of harassment were redefined for military readiness activities: “Level A 
harassment,” meaning an act that injures or has the significant potential to injure a marine 
mammal or marine mammal stock; and “Level B harassment,” meaning the act disturbs or is 
likely to disturb a marine mammal or marine mammal stock by causing disruption of behavioral 
patterns, such as migration, breathing, nursing, breeding, feeding, or sheltering, to a point where 
such behavioral patterns are abandoned or significantly altered.12 This is distinct from the other 
definition of harassment, which is an act that 
                                                                
7
 16 U.S.C. § 1361(2). 
8
 16 U.S.C. § 1361(2). 
9
 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a). 
10
 16 U.S.C. § 1362(8). 
11
 P.L. 108-136, § 319(f), 117 Stat. 1434. 
12
 P.L. 108-136, § 319, 117 Stat. 1433; 16 U.S.C. § 1362(18). These definitions also apply to federal scientific research 
activity. 
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(i) has the potential to injure a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild; or 
(ii) has the potential to disturb a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild by 
causing disruption of behavioral patterns, including, but not limited to, migration, breathing, 
nursing, breeding, feeding, or sheltering. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(18). 
In other words, more harm is required for military readiness activities before they rise to the 
statutory level of harassment. 
The other aspect of the MMPA that is different for the Department of Defense than for others is 
the provision for incidental take permits. For any taking, it must be shown that the activity will 
make “the least practical adverse impact on such species or stock and its habitat.”13 As mentioned 
earlier, activities for the national defense are exempt if invoked. For military readiness activities, 
the factors to consider in determining the least practical adverse impact include personnel safety, 
practicality of implementation, and impact on the effectiveness of the activity.14 

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) (16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq.) protects certain species and their 
habitats. It is illegal under the ESA to harm a species that has been listed as endangered (a species 
that is in danger of extinction).15 Additional protections are provided for threatened species (a 
species that is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future).16 While the 
MMPA protects marine mammals, the ESA covers only those marine mammals that are listed. 
Just as under the MMPA, the ESA has some exceptions. The law provides that species may be 
killed or harmed without penalty if the injury is incidental to a lawful purpose and certain 
procedures are followed.17 Actions by the federal government, including the military, require the 
agency to consult with either the Secretary of Commerce or the Secretary of the Interior to ensure 
that the project is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threatened 
species or result in destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat.18 This process is called 
a Section 7 consultation. The Secretary is required to use the “best scientific and commercial data 
available” to identify whether any endangered or threatened species may be present, in which 
case the agency will prepare a biological assessment to identify any such species likely to be 
affected. The Secretary must issue an incidental take statement with reasonable and prudent 
alternative actions for the agency to take if the action is likely to jeopardize a species. If a “no 
jeopardy” conclusion is reached, the incidental take statement will specify reasonable and prudent 
measures to take to minimize impacts of the action. Where a marine mammal is involved, the 
incidental take statement must also consider compliance with the MMPA.19 
                                                                
13
 16 U.S.C. § 1371(5)(A)(i)(II)(aa). 
14
 P.L. 108-136, 319, 117 Stat. 1434; 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(A)(ii). 
15
 16 U.S.C. § 1538. 
16
 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20). 
17
 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(o)(2), 1539. 
18
 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
19
 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(C). 
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The purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is to have federal agencies 
consider the impacts of their actions on the environment.20 For major federal actions that 
significantly affect the environment, an agency is required to produce an environmental impact 
statement (EIS), evaluating the environmental impact, any adverse environmental effects of the 
proposed action, and alternatives to the action. When an agency is not certain that its action will 
significantly affect the environment, it will prepare an environmental assessment (EA). The EA 
also considers the environmental impacts and alternatives, but is not as in-depth as the EIS. If the 
EA concludes that there are no significant impacts, no EIS is required, and a Finding of No 
Significant Impact (FONSI) is issued. 
There is no blanket exemption for NEPA, although alternative arrangements may be provided in 
the case of emergencies, and certain statutes excuse specific actions from compliance. Under the 
regulation applying to emergencies, 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11, the Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ), an office of the White House, may allow an agency to take different steps to be in 
compliance, or allow an action to commence prior to completion of the required review. Section 
1506.11 states: 
Where emergency circumstances make it necessary to take an action with significant 
environmental impact without observing the provisions of these regulations, the Federal 
agency taking the action should consult with the Council about alternative arrangements. 
Agencies and the Council will limit such arrangements to actions necessary to control the 
immediate impacts of the emergency. Other actions remain subject to NEPA review. 
According to CEQ, this provision has been requested just 41 times since the regulations took 
effect in 1978.21 It provides for alternative provisions for those instances where there is not 
enough time to complete the required environmental document, but limits those alternatives to 
just what is necessary to “control the immediate impacts of the emergency.” 
	
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The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) sets up a scheme for states to manage their coastal 
resources with federal oversight.22 States develop coastal management plans (CMP) that regulate 
private and public development of coastal resources. Coastal zone is defined under the act to 
include coastal waters and adjacent shorelands “strongly influenced by each other.”23 The plans 
must be approved by the Secretary of Commerce. The state must find that actions that could 
affect coastal resources are consistent with its CMP. If so, the state will issue a certificate of 
consistency. Once the state has made its final determination, if the federal agency objects to the 
state’s conclusions, it may bring the matter before the Secretary of Commerce. Where the 
                                                                
20
 42 U.S.C. § 4332. 
21
 Information obtained via written communication with CEQ (January 22, 2008). 
22
 P.L. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972); 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. 
23
 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1). A state’s coastal waters generally reach three nautical miles (nm) beyond its shores. 43 U.S.C. § 
1301. 
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Secretary finds that the project was consistent with the objectives of the CZMA, or necessary for 
national security, the state decision may be overturned. 
An exemption from the CZMA is provided within the law, giving the President the right to excuse 
a federal agency from complying with a state CMP if the action is in the paramount interest of the 
United States. However, it is not available until after a court has ruled against the federal agency: 
After any final judgment, decree, or order of any Federal court that is appealable ... or under 
any other applicable provision of Federal law, that a specific Federal agency activity is not in 
compliance with subparagraph (A), and certification by the Secretary that mediation under 
subsection (h) of this section is not likely to result in such compliance, the President may, 
upon written request from the Secretary, exempt from compliance those elements of the 
Federal agency activity that are found by the Federal court to be inconsistent with an 
approved State program, if the President determines that the activity is in the paramount 
interest of the United States. No such exemption shall be granted on the basis of a lack of 
appropriations unless the President has specifically requested such appropriations as part of 
the budgetary process, and the Congress has failed to make available the requested 
appropriations.24 
After a court has ruled an action conflicts with a state’s CMP, the President may find that the 
action is of paramount interest to the nation, and exempt the federal agency from the measures 
imposed upon it by the court.25 
There is no private right of action under the CZMA, so suits brought by non-parties to challenge 
an activity must be brought under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 
 !
"
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The battle over sonar use in Navy training exercises and the impact on marine mammals has been 
ongoing for years. Legal challenges to the use of low-frequency sonar were brought before the 
District Court for the Northern District of California, but were settled by the Navy in 2008.26 The 
challenges to the use of MFA sonar began in the District Court for the Central District of 
California. The lead plaintiff in the MFA cases is the Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC); four other environmental groups are plaintiffs, as well as Jean-Michel Cousteau. The 
defendants include the Secretary of the Navy and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
of the Department of Commerce. 
The first decision in the MFA challenge was issued in August 2007.27 It granted a preliminary 
injunction to halt the eleven remaining Navy training exercises that were planned. The plaintiffs 
claimed that the Navy had violated three laws: ESA, NEPA, and CZMA. The court agreed that 
                                                                
24
 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(B). 
25
 In a decision dated February 4, 2008, a federal judge suggested that this provision may be unconstitutional when it 
was used not to change an underlying law but to revise a court decision. The court stated that this could have the effect 
of the President acting as a reviewing court in violation of Article III of the Constitution. NRDC v. Winter, 527 F. 
Supp. 2d 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2008). This report does not evaluate this argument. 
26
 NRDC v. Gutierrez, No. 07-4771-EDL (N.D. Cal. August 12, 2008) (order approving the settlement agreement 
wherein the Navy agreed to limit low-frequency sonar training to certain areas of the Pacific Ocean, rather than the 
worldwide scope as originally planned). 
27
 NRDC v. Winter, 2007 WL 2481037 (C.D. Cal. August 7, 2007). 
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the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claims under the CZMA and NEPA and issued the 
injunction, but held that the ESA claim was not likely to succeed. Since neither NEPA nor CZMA 
provides a separate right for litigation, the court reviewed claims brought related to these statutes 
under the standard set by the APA—to see whether the agency action was arbitrary and 
capricious. 
The Navy had prepared an EA-FONSI under NEPA, concluding that there were no significant 
adverse environment effects that would require an EIS. Among the adverse environmental affects 
the environmental review estimated to occur as a result of the training exercises were 170,000 
incidents of Level B harassment to marine mammals, 466 permanent injuries to beaked or ziphiid 
whales (some of which are endangered), and 28 Temporary Threshold Shift exposures to 
endangered blue, fin, humpback, sei, and sperm whales. The court said it was likely to be held 
that the Navy should have prepared an EIS after finding these effects, and that the Navy did not 
adequately review alternatives to its training plan. 
The court also found that there was a likelihood that the Navy violated the CZMA. According to 
the Navy, the MFA training was consistent with the state CMP because it would not affect 
California’s coastal resources, and the Navy did not need to adopt the mitigation measures 
California deemed necessary. The court suggested that the Navy’s determination that its exercises 
would not harm coastal resources could be found arbitrary and capricious. 
The court issued a preliminary injunction, halting the training activities until a full review could 
be conducted. The Navy appealed, and on August 31, 2007, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
stayed the injunction, meaning the injunction was put aside, but not rejected outright.28 Later, in 
November, the Ninth Circuit dissolved the stay, meaning the Navy was again enjoined from 
conducting MFA exercises.29 The case was remanded to the district court, with instructions from 
the Ninth Circuit that the injunction should be fitted to the circumstances. 
On January 3, 2008, the district court again issued a preliminary injunction, stopping the Navy 
from conducting MFA training unless certain mitigation measures were taken. According to the 
court order, those measures were 
• 12-mile exclusion zone off California coast, 
• 2200-yard sonar shut down, 
• 60-minute monitoring period using two trained monitors at all times and using 
helicopters, 
• for active dipping sonar, helicopter monitoring for 10 minutes, 
• where surface ducting conditions are found, sonar reduced by 6 dB, 
• no MFA in Catalina basin, because it is a choke point for animals, 
• no MFA within 5 nautical miles (nm) of San Clemente Island, and 
                                                                
28
 NRDC v. Winter, 502 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2007). 
29
 NRDC v. Winter, 508 F.3d. 885 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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• mitigation measures from the 2007 National Defense Exemption (“NDE II”) to 
the MMPA unless they are not as strict as this order.30 
• A second order on January 10, 2008, was issued to clarify the January 3, 2008, 
decision. 
• On January 10, 2008, the Navy wrote CEQ asking for alternative arrangements to 
NEPA that would allow them to conduct the remaining training exercises as 
scheduled. CEQ said the Navy indicated that some of the mitigation measures 
required by the district court would “create a significant and unreasonable risk 
that Strike Groups will not be able to train and be certified as fully mission 
capable.”31 On January 15, 2008, CEQ provided alternative arrangements that 
paralleled the 2007 NDE mitigation measures (see Table 3). 
• Also on January 15, 2008, the President of the United States exempted the Navy 
exercises from compliance with the CZMA, using the authority under 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1456(c)(1)(B). In the memorandum granting the exemption, the President 
stated that “the use of mid-frequency active sonar in these exercises [is] in the 
paramount interest of the United States.” 
• After the two exemptions granted on January 15, the Navy applied to the Ninth 
Circuit to vacate the injunction. The Ninth Circuit remanded the action to the 
district court on January 16, 2008.32 
• On February 5, 2008, the district court reconsidered the preliminary injunction in 
light of the developments. The court held that the CEQ had acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in granting alternative arrangements to the Navy when there was no 
actual emergency: 
CEQ apprehended the phrase “emergency circumstances” to refer to sudden, unanticipated 
events, not the unfavorable consequences of protracted litigation. CEQ’s contrary 
interpretation in this case is “plainly erroneous and inconsistent” with the regulation and, 
concomitantly, not entitled to deference.33 
The court held that the Navy still had to comply with NEPA. Therefore, its injunction remained in 
place and the Navy could conduct MFA training only if it used the mitigation measures required 
by the court. The court stated that public interest was best served by requiring those mitigation 
measures. In that way the Navy would have the benefit of conducting training, and the natural 
resources would have limited harm from the training. The court reviewed, but did not rule on, the 
CZMA exemption. 
The Navy moved to have the injunction stayed, but the Ninth Circuit denied the request.34 On 
February 29, 2008, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Navy’s appeal of the preliminary injunction.35 It 
                                                                
30
 NRDC v. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2008). See Table 3 for the mitigation measures. 
31
 Letter from James L. Connaughton, Chairman, CEQ, to Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy (January 15, 2008), 
p. 3, available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/Letter_from_Chairman_Connaughton_to_Secretary_
Winter.pdf. 
32
 NRDC v. Winter, 513 F. 3d 920 (9th Cir. 2008). 
33
 NRDC v. Winter, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1229 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
34
 NRDC v. Winter, 516 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2008). 
35
 NRDC v. Winter, 518 F. 3d 658 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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found that CEQ’s interpretation of emergency circumstances was “overly broad.”36 The Ninth 
Circuit described the course of litigation that ended in the injunction as “a series of events [that] 
gives rise to a predictable outcome” and not a sudden and unexpected occurrence. The Ninth 
Circuit compared it to CEQ’s response to Hurricane Katrina, in which alternative arrangements 
were provided because “there was not sufficient time to follow the regular EIS process.”37 
In a separate opinion, the Ninth Circuit modified two of the mitigation measures required by the 
district court.38 The Ninth Circuit allowed the 2,200-yard suspension to remain in place unless the 
training was at “a critical point in the exercise,” in which case the Navy would reduce the sonar 
by 6 dB if a marine mammal was detected within 1,000 m., 10 dB if within 500 m., and suspend 
the activity if within 200 m. The second modification was for when significant surface ducting 
conditions were detected. Rather than shutting down the training, as required by the district court, 
the Ninth Circuit required the Navy to reduce the decibels of the activity. (See Table 3 for 
details.) Therefore, the Navy can conduct its training exercises provided it uses the mitigation 
measures indicated by the court. The Navy petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Ninth 
Circuit decision.39 
The Supreme Court reviewed two claims brought by the Navy: whether the CEQ acted within its 
authority to grant the alternative arrangements, and whether the injunction based on NEPA 
violations was appropriate. In a 5-4 decision, the majority of the Supreme Court held that the 
balance of public interests favored allowing the training to continue. It did not review the merits 
of the case. Instead, the majority ruled that the district court did not consider the correct balance 
of public interests. The majority found that the public interest in national defense outweighed the 
public interest in protecting marine mammals: 
we conclude that the balance of equities and consideration of the overall public interest in 
this case tip strongly in favor of the Navy. For the plaintiffs, the most serious possible injury 
would be harm to an unknown number of the marine mammals that they study and observe. 
In contrast, forcing the Navy to deploy an inadequately trained antisubmarine force 
jeopardizes the safety of the fleet.40 
The dissenting opinion focused on the balance of interests in the context of NEPA.41 Rather than 
an issue of a well-trained military versus animal safety, it considered the issue as what harm 
would occur to the Navy by delaying training until it complied with NEPA.42 Based on that view 
of the case, the dissenters found the balance weighed in favor of protecting the marine mammals. 
The dissenters indicated that the Navy’s agreement to prepare an EIS after the training was 
completed was contrary to the purpose of the statute. 
Only the dissenting opinion discussed the alternative arrangements provided by CEQ. The 
opinion said, “CEQ lacks authority to absolve an agency of its statutory duty to prepare an EIS,” 
                                                                
36
 NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 680 (9th Cir. 2008). 
37
 NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 682 (9th Cir. 2008). 
38
 NRDC v. Winter, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 4458, *4 (9th Cir. February 29, 2008). 
39
 NRDC v. Winter, No. 07-1239 (March 31, 2008). 
40
 Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008) (JJ. Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas). 
41
 Two justices participated in this opinion (JJ. Ginsberg and Souter). Two others concurred in part and dissented in 
part (JJ. Breyer and Stevens). 
42
 The majority had discussed the EA, finding that, at 293 pages, it evidenced a hard look at the environmental 
consequences of the training. 
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indicating that legislative options were available to the Navy. The legislative option would be to 
obtain a statutory exemption from NEPA for the training program. 
"
The injunction ultimately was put in place by a holding that CEQ had been arbitrary and 
capricious in granting an emergency exception under NEPA. A legal analysis of the court’s 
decision is somewhat hampered by the few court decisions and the brief regulatory history of 
Section 1506.11. CEQ has recorded only 41 instances where it was contacted to obtain alternative 
arrangements since the regulation went into place in 1978, and only three (until this case) have 
led to published decisions.43 While the dissenting opinion openly challenges the authority of the 
CEQ to circumvent NEPA, noting that alternative arrangements are issued based on a “one-sided 
record,” it is persuasive authority only, and not legal precedent for interpreting the regulation. 
Section 1506.11 was part of the initial regulations created for CEQ to implement NEPA in 
response to an Executive Order.44 The regulation has no direct statutory authority, but can be 
supported by 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b), which states it is the responsibility of the U.S. government to 
“use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy” to 
consider the environmental impacts of its actions.45 The final version of the alternative 
arrangements regulation differed only slightly from the draft. The initial wording had said that 
under emergency circumstances “the Federal agency proposing to take the action should consult 
with the Council about alternative arrangements.”46 Out of concern that the regulation could be 
construed as requiring consultation before an emergency occurred,47 the regulation was modified 
to read as follows: 
Where emergency circumstances make it necessary to take an action with significant 
environmental impact without observing the provisions of these regulations, the Federal 
agency taking the action should consult with the council about alternative arrangements. 
Agencies and the council will limit such arrangements to actions necessary to control the 
immediate impacts of the emergency. Other actions remain subject to NEPA review.48 
The regulation has not changed since then. 
                                                                
43
 Two other court decisions refer to alternative arrangements by CEQ, but the emergency exemption was not in 
dispute. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2007) 
(discussing how the Corps of Engineers obtained alternative arrangements for a temporary operating plan); NRDC v. 
Peña, 20 F. Supp. 2d 45, 50 (D.D.C. 1998) (discussing that if the CEQ issued alternative arrangements, the DOE could 
act before completing the NEPA document required by the court’s order). 
44
 43 Fed. Reg. 25230 (June 9, 1978) (draft regulations); 43 Fed. Reg. 55978 (November 29, 1978) (final regulations). 
Executive Order 11991 (June 9, 1978). 
45
 The dissenting opinion in Winter v. NRDC, No. 07-1339 (November 12, 2008) appeared to have trouble with the 
congressional authority behind the regulation. The dissent said that a “rapid, self-serving resort to an office in the White 
House ... is surely not what Congress had in mind when it instructed agencies to comply with NEPA ‘to the fullest 
extent possible.’” 
46
 43 Fed. Reg. 25230, 25243 (June 9, 1978). 
47
 43 Fed. Reg. 55978, 55988 (November 29, 1978). 
48
 43 Fed. Reg. 55978, 55988 (November 29, 1978); 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11. 
 	



 
The court in the MFA cases found CEQ had acted beyond the scope of Section 1506.11 when it 
provided alternative actions for the Navy to conduct rather than requiring the Navy to complete 
an EIS as directed by the court. Courts give agencies deference regarding the interpretation of 
their regulations, including the emergency provision, and the CEQ’s interpretation of its 
regulations is entitled to substantial deference.49 However, where an agency’s interpretation defies 
the plain meaning of a regulation, courts have rejected the agency’s interpretation.50 That has not 
happened before in the context of the NEPA emergency provision. 
The few courts that have considered challenges to a CEQ alternative arrangement have upheld the 
CEQ’s determination. Those requests included agencies seeking alternative arrangements for 
these actions: 
• capturing all remaining California condors to remove them from the wild; 
• releasing HUD funding for an urban redevelopment project in Detroit; and 
• allowing night flights from an Air Force base to assist in Operation Desert Storm. 
The alternative arrangements illustrated by these cases differ from the MFA alternative 
arrangements by the fact that each of these agency actions was backed by a satisfactory NEPA 
document, either before or after the action.51 In the instant case, the only NEPA document, an EA-
FONSI, was found insufficient. 
A reviewing court will look at the underlying agency action to decide whether the CEQ’s 
determination is rational. In the case of the California condor, the court considered why the Fish 
and Wildlife Service (FWS) had changed its policy. The EA-FONSI preferred alternative had 
been to leave some condor in the wild and to capture others. The district court had found no 
emergency because FWS had reviewed the situation just months earlier in an EA. The D.C. 
Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in substituting its judgment for the CEQ. The 
D.C. Circuit found that FWS had a rational basis for changing its policy, especially in light of the 
lead poisoning death of a condor in an area believed safe. The court said that once it had 
determined that the underlying agency decision “reflects sufficient attention to environmental 
concerns and is adequately reasoned and explained” its review was completed.52 The capture was 
consistent with the alternatives examined in the EA-FONSI. The MFA sonar case differs in that 
the underlying EA-FONSI has been found insufficient. Also, the court suggested the Navy lacked 
a rational basis for declaring the training exercises an emergency. 
The emergency in the case of Detroit was not one of military readiness. Instead, it was argued that 
a major corporation would leave the city if funding were not provided for an urban renewal 
project, putting the city in immediate financial peril. The Department of Housing and Urban 
                                                                
49
 Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979); Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301, 1309-
1310 (1974). 
50
 Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)(“we must defer to the Secretary’s interpretation 
unless an ‘alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the Secretary’s 
intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation’” (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988)); Bowles 
v. Seminole Rock and Sand, 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)(“the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which 
becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”). 
51
 See also Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2007) 
(referring to how CEQ required an EIS after the alternative arrangements were completed). 
52
 National Audubon Society v. Hester, 801 F.2d 405, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
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Development (HUD) was allowed to release funding prior to the completion of an EIS.53 The EIS 
was subsequently completed. This differs from the MFA alternative arrangements in which an EIS 
was waived, rather than deferred. 
The only military action reviewed by the courts in response to a challenge to the application of 
Section 1506.11 related to night flights out of an Air Force base. An EIS completed years earlier 
had supported the decision that flights would not occur between the hours of 10 pm and 7 am. 
However, concurrent with the U.S. commitment of forces to Operation Desert Storm, the Air 
Force began 24-hour operations out of that base. The plaintiffs asked the Air Force to conduct a 
supplemental EIS prior to the flights, but the Air Force sought alternative arrangements from the 
CEQ. The alternative arrangements proposed by CEQ allowed the flights to continue and allowed 
the Air Force to prepare an EA within the year. The court considered whether the Air Force or 
CEQ had been arbitrary and capricious in allowing the NEPA exception.54 The court found that 
“the crisis in the Middle East” was an emergency. The court noted that the Air Force was 
particular in describing the emergency need: “defendants have pointed to specific military 
concerns with regard to troop redeployment, flight scheduling, cargo transport, and other 
operations that necessitate the use of Westover AFB for C-5A operations on a twenty-four hour 
basis.”55 
In the instant case, the court distinguished the facts from the Air Force exception, noting the Air 
Force’s circumstances had changed after an EIS had been prepared, but in this case no change had 
occurred. Also, the court criticized the Navy’s characterization of the emergency, noting that these 
routine training exercises had been planned for a long time, and suggesting that the Navy was 
seeking ways to avoid preparing the EIS ordered by the court. The court said CEQ had not used 
the plain meaning of “emergency.”56 The court found CEQ chose mitigation measures that had 
already been rejected by the court. According to the court, this “raises serious constitutional 
concerns under the Separation of Powers doctrine,” but the court found that because CEQ’s 
application of Section 1506.11 was invalid, it did not need to examine the constitutional issue.57 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the rationale of the lower court, noting that there was no national 
security or military exemption within NEPA.58 
                                                                
53
 Crosby v. Young, 512 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
54
 Valley Citizens for a Safe Environment v. Vest, 1991 WL 330963 (D. Mass. May 6, 1991). 
55
 Valley Citizens for a Safe Environment v. Vest, 1991 WL 330963, *5 (D. Mass. May 6, 1991). 
56
 NRDC v. Winter, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1229-30 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
57
 NRDC v. Winter, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1232 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
58
 NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 684-85 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Winter v. NRDC, No. 07-1239 (June 
23, 2008). 
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Table 1. Listed Species Found Off the California Coast 
Classification Common Name Scientific Name 
T  Salmon, Chinook CA Central Valley spring-run Oncorhynchus (=Salmo) tshawytscha 
T  Salmon, Chinook CA coastal Oncorhynchus (=Salmo) tshawytscha 
E  Salmon, Chinook winter Sacramento R. Oncorhynchus (=Salmo) tshawytscha 
T  Salmon, Coho OR, CA pop. Oncorhynchus (=Salmo) kisutch 
E  Salmon, Coho central CA coast Oncorhynchus (=Salmo) kisutch 
T  Sea turtle, green except where endangered Chelonia mydas 
E  Sea turtle, leatherback Dermochelys coriacea 
T   Sea turtle, loggerhead Caretta caretta 
T  Sea turtle, olive ridley except where endangered Lepidochelys olivacea 
T  Sea-lion, Steller eastern pop.  Eumetopias jubatus 
E  Sea-lion, Steller western pop. Eumetopias jubatus 
T  Seal, Guadalupe fur Arctocephalus townsendi 
T  Steelhead Central Valley CA Oncorhynchus (=Salmo) mykiss 
T  Steelhead central CA coast Oncorhynchus (=Salmo) mykiss 
T  Steelhead northern CA Oncorhynchus (=Salmo) mykiss 
T  Steelhead south central CA coast Oncorhynchus (=Salmo) mykiss 
E  Steelhead southern CA coast Oncorhynchus (=Salmo) mykiss 
E Blue whale Balaenoptera musculus 
E  Finback whale Balaenoptera physalus 
E  Humpback whale Megaptera novaeangliae 
E  Killer Southern whale Resident DPS Orcinus orca 
E  Sei whale Balaenoptera borealis 
E  Sperm whale Physeter catodon (=macrocephalus) 
Source: Information obtained from Fish and Wildlife Service website: http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/
StateListing.do?status=listed&state=CA. 
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Table 2. Litigation Timeline 
Date Action Decision 
August 7, 
2007 
Preliminary injunction 
granted. 
NRDC v. Winter, 8:07-cv-00335-FMC-FMOx, 2007 WL 2481037 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2007) 
August 31, 
2007 
Injunction stayed. NRDC v. Winter, 502 F.3d 859 (9
th
 Cir. 2007) 
November 
13, 2007 
Ninth Circuit dissolves stay. 
Remands to district court to 
narrow injunction. 
NRDC v. Winter, 508 F.3d. 885 (9
th
 Cir. 2007) 
January 3, 
2008 
District court enjoins Navy, 
but allows training if certain 
measures are taken.  
NRDC v. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 
January 9, 
2008 
Navy seeks stay pending 
appeal. 
 
January 10, 
2008 
District court issues modified 
injunction. 
 
January 15, 
2008 
President exempts Navy from 
CZMA, pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1456(c)(1)(B). 
 
January 15, 
2008 
CEQ issues alternative 
arrangements under NEPA 
for Navy, pursuant to 50 
C.F.R. § 1506.11. 
Online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/
Letter_from_Chairman_Connaughton_to_Secretary_Winter.pdf 
January 16, 
2008 
Ninth Circuit remands to 
district court to consider Jan. 
15 actions. 
NRDC v. Winter, 513 F. 3d 920 (9
th
 Cir. 2008) 
February 4, 
2008 
District court finds that 
CEQ’s actions were arbitrary 
and restores injunction. 
NRDC v. Winter, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 
February 
19, 2008 
Ninth Circuit rejects Navy’s 
motion for a stay. 
NRDC v. Winter, 516 F.3d 1103 (9
th
 Cir. 2008) 
February 
29, 2008 
Ninth Circuit affirms 
preliminary injunction. 
NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658 (9
th
 Cir. 2008) 
February 
29, 2008 
Ninth Circuit modifies two 
mitigation measures, allowing 
sonar reduction when at 
critical point of the exercise 
and during surface ducting 
conditions. 
NRDC v. Winter, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 4458 (9
th
 Cir. Feb. 29, 2008) 
March 31, 
2008 
Navy petitions the U.S. 
Supreme Court to review the 
Ninth Circuit decision. 
NRDC v. Winter, No. 07-1239 (March 31, 2008) 
November 
12, 2008 
U.S. Supreme Court finds in 
favor of the Navy. 
Winter v. NRDC,129 S. Ct. 365 (2008) 
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Table 3. Mitigation Measures 
(data gleaned from court documents; may be incomplete) 
Type of 
Action 2007 NME Plaintiffs Court CEQ 
Powering 
down sonar 
Reduce by 6 dB when 
marine mammals 
spotted within 1,000 
m.; reduce another 4 
dB when within 500 
m.; shut down sonar 
at 200 m. 
 2200 yd. sonar shut down 
when animals are spotted; 
reduce by 6 dB 
where surface ducting 
conditions are found 
—— 
Modified by Ninth Circuit: 
if during “critical point in 
the exercise,” reduction 
by 6 dB if within 1000 m., 
10 dB if within 500 m., and 
suspend the activity if 
within 200 m. 
Surface ducting 
modification: 
reduce by 6 dB if within 
2,000 m., 10 dB within 
1,000 m., and suspend 
sonar use if within 500 m. 
Reduce by 6dB if within 
1,000 m.; reduce by 
additional 4 dB if within 
500 m.; shut down 
transmissions at 200 m. 
Lookouts 2 dedicated, and 3 
non-dedicated marine 
mammal lookouts, 
provide lookouts with 
binoculars, night 
vision goggles, and 
infrared sensors. 
 60-minute monitoring 
period prior to each day’s 
training; two NMFS 
trained monitors at all 
times during exercise; 
passive acoustic 
monitoring to be used to 
the maximum extent 
practicable; use 
helicopters. 
2 lookouts and 3 non-
dedicated 
watchstanders. 
 
Helicopters   At least one dedicated 
helicopter for monitoring; 
aerial monitoring to begin 
60 mins before and 
throughout training; 
additional helicopter 
monitoring 10 minutes 
before active dipping 
sonar. 
“Aerial platforms” will 
monitor during their 
missions. 
Geographical 
Restrictions 
Outside Channel 
Islands Nat’l Marine 
Sanctuary; 
5 nautical miles (nm) 
from western shore 
of San Clemente 
Island; 3 nm from its 
other shores. 
25 nm coastal 
exclusion; 
excluded from 
Catalina Basin; 
excluded from 
the Westfall 
seamount; 
excluded from 
12 mile exclusion zone off 
California coast; 
barred in Catalina basin; 
5 nm exclusion from 
western shore of San 
Clemente Island. 
5 nm exclusion from 
western shore of San 
Clemente Island. 
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Type of 
Action 2007 NME Plaintiffs Court CEQ 
Cortez and 
Tanner Banks; 
and 
exercises 
located to the 
maximum 
extent possible 
in waters 
deeper than 
1,500 m. 
Changes for 
Migration 
Aerial monitoring for 
60 mins before MFA 
exercises along 
Tanner & Cortez 
Banks during blue 
whale migration (July 
to Sept. 2008); 
pre-exercise 
monitoring of gray 
whale migration 
patterns between 
March 7-21, 2008, and 
April 15 - May 15, 
2008. 
   
Other    Navy to submit after-
action reports to 
NMFS 120 days after 
any exercise. 
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